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The recent global financial crisis has heavily reshaped the banking business around the 
world, especially during the past couple of years. All national banks within the European 
Union are influenced by decisions made on a global and on a European level, and many 
times it is failed to notice that the new banking regulations in terms of capital, liquidity, re-
solvability are not just endless red tape, but binding set of regulations that inevitably 
change the business environment where banks are operating. The banking sector in the 
European Union is in a turning point, as banks are forced to better understand and re-
spond to the three growing sources of pressures – customers, investors, and regulators – 
all of them having diverse and even conflicting demands towards banks. 
 
The investigative research was conducted by collecting high-quality, secondary data 
online, including reports and memos by the European Union, articles and investigative re-
ports from different respected institutions, and articles published by financial professionals 
in different newspapers. The evolving banking regulation sphere raises questions and var-
ying opinions among financial leaders and especially within banks, and thus the topic could 
be viewed from multiple different point-of-views. This research provides an objective view 
on the current, demanding, situation banks are facing. The thesis is written in a consulta-
tive manner, to help all possible stakeholders understand the phenomenon and give some 
guidance how to adapt. 
 
The research tackles the question how the European banks are affected by the regulatory 
reforms, by investigating how banking regulation framework is formed in the EU and who 
are the regulators. In the end, one can learn how the European banks are affected by the 
regulative changes in reality. It is clear that the pressures from various sources are greater 
than ever before, and some banks fail to meet the new requirements. However, as the 
study shows, banks can also learn to identify the drivers behind the current regulatory 
changes and find new cost-efficient ways to improve their business models and this way 
comply with the new banking regulations. 
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1 Introduction 
The movie What to Expect When You Are Expecting tells a story of men and women in 
front of something new. The couples struggle with multiple questions when it comes to 
waiting for their first child to be born – so many questions, limited waiting period, and in 
the end coping with the reality. The movie might be telling a story of one’s personal life, 
and seem very irrelevant in this context, but at the moment financial regulative reforms 
form the exact same question to banks and other financial actors: what to expect from the 
future when new financial regulation reforms keep emerging and there is no end in sight? 
It is clear that the ongoing changes in banking regulation are affecting all banks in Europe 
forcing them to reshape and optimize their current business models to planning supportive 
financial models. Banks need to find their way to keep on top with new emerging regula-
tions and demands, find cost-efficient methods to implement any required changes in the 
operations, and finally being prepared for recovery and resolution actions in case of fail-
ure. 
 
1.1 Research problem and demarcation 
Financial regulations form a very complex topic that could be viewed from a number of dif-
ferent perspectives and could be researched to a great extent. I chose to focus my re-
search on how the system of current financial regulative framework in Europe has devel-
oped from the 1970s to this day, having the main focus on the 21st century, and how the 
changes in business environment relate to the banks’ operations today. I also had to 
make a clear demarcation on the concept “financial regulation” and chose to focus only on 
banking regulation leaving out the insurance sector that is also strongly regulated and 
partly even by the same organizations. If one thinks about the whole concept “regulation”, 
it is clear that it has many interpretations. In this thesis the regulation is referred to as “a 
rule of order having the force of law, prescribed by a superior or competent authority, re-
lating to the actions of those under the authority's control” (The Free Dictionary 2014). In 
this thesis the regulators are operating globally and at the European level, and thus their 
decisions are passed on to national supervisors. 
 
There are a number of different regulatory reforms, but in this thesis the focus is on the 
development of current and upcoming regulations related to capital, liquidity, and resolva-
bility requirements imposed mutually for all banks in the European Union. Due to a strict 
demarcation, this thesis is not taking a stance on the operations of national supervisory 
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authorities, but is concentrating on the most important regulatory institutions or organiza-
tions affecting banking regulatory changes at the European level. The importance of these 
institutions is strictly the view of the researcher/writer. 
 
1.2 Research methods 
Research for this thesis is conducted by using qualitative descriptive research method. 
The topic fits well in the form of what, why, how, and when. My goal is to collect high-qual-
ity secondary data from various sources to form comprehensive picture of the current 
banking regulation sphere in the European Union and show the reader also how evolving 
banking regulations affect individual banks and their operations. The topic is widely de-
bated and discussed due to hard economic times and continuous changes in banking reg-
ulations. The overflow of information sets its own challenges and makes it even more im-
portant to keep within the demarcated topic. 
 
As also recognized by the European Commission, assessing the impact of regulations 
based on purely quantitative methods would be impossible. A memo by the Commission 
states that the full impact of financial regulations cannot be reliably assessed on quantita-
tive basis, as the impact of regulations is impossible to isolate from other factors in econ-
omy, as well as from other changes in macroeconomics (European Commission Memo 
2014, 3). Also, economic reforms, or sets of regulations, are targeted towards such mar-
ket variables that does not provide accurate or publicly available data that could be bench-
marked to the situation before regulative reforms. 
 
1.3 Thesis structure 
Figure 1 illustrates the structure of this thesis and the interrelation of the research ques-
tion to the three investigative questions. The main research topic is evolving banking regu-
lation framework in the European Union, and it will be discussed from two various per-
spectives – theoretical part concentrating on the regulative perspective (investigative 
questions one and two), and the empirical part briefly describing how evolving banking 
regulation affects the banks in reality (investigative question 3). 
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Figure 1: Research question and investigative questions 1-3 
 
In the theory part, the reader will be introduced to the main economic theories affecting 
regulatory policy making. After introducing suitable economic theories, one will gain in-
sightful view of who are the institutions responsible for designing, proposing, and imple-
menting new banking regulations in European Union. These institutions or organizations I 
call regulators. After answering to the question “who”, I will present my view on how the 
banking regulatory system has developed to this day, and how regulations are being 
shaped today. Theory part reflects to the paradigm behind this thesis topic: the current 
banking regulation system is extremely complex and difficult to understand, but despite 
the complexity of it, it forms the core of banks’ operations.  
 
After the theory part including economic theories and the representation of regulative insti-
tutions, the reader has a chance to see how evolving banking regulations affect banks’ op-
erations in reality. Evolving bank regulation sets banks in front of new kinds of pressures 
towards their customers, investors, and regulators, and it is interesting to see the various 
effects it has. 
 
1.4 Key concepts 
Key concepts of this thesis include bank, bank regulation, banking regulation framework, 
regulator, capital, Tier 1 capital ratio, liquidity, resolvability, Global systematically im-
portant banks (also known as banks too big to fail), and the concept of “three pressures”. 
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IQ1: Banking regulatory framework in 
Europe - Who are the regulators?
IQ2: Banking regulatory framework in 
Europe - How is it shaped and working 
today?
IQ3: How are evolving banking regulations 
reshaping banks’ business?
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In this section I will briefly identify each of the terms in order for the reader to understand 
their importance in relation to the thesis topic and scope. In addition I have listed explana-
tions of some abbreviations that frequently appear in this thesis. 
 
Bank 
 
In this thesis a bank is referred to be a financial institution that holds a banking license 
and is thus able to receive deposits and grant loans. Bank in this sense includes commer-
cial/retail banks, as well as savings banks (Investopedia 2014.)  
 
Bank regulation 
 
Bank regulations are “the laws and bureaucratic rules governing banking” (The Free Dic-
tionary by Farlex, 2012). Term bank regulation raises many opinions and thus has various 
definitions, but in this thesis “bank regulation” is considered as a set of rules that call for 
maintaining confidence in banking and this way prevent failures that could cause future 
major damage to the overall economy at European level. Bank regulations are passed to 
banks at different levels by regulators, but in this thesis the concentration is on the global 
regulators passing the regulations down to national supervisors. 
 
Banking regulation framework 
 
The term “banking regulation framework” is used throughout this thesis to describe the 
broader aspect of banking regulations. As I studied the topic, it turned out that banking 
regulations on a European level never existed as discrete individual regulations, but as 
part of bigger entities concerning for example the required liquidity levels of banks to avoid 
bank failures. As an example of a banking regulation framework for EU we may use the 
new Basel III. It provides central banks a number of recommendable banking regulations 
concerning liquidity, capital adequacy, and stress tests, and thus forms a new banking 
regulatory framework. Regulators in the European Union then decide how the framework 
will be implemented on a European and national level, and how it will be passed on to in-
dividual banks. 
 
Regulator 
 
The official definition by Cambridge Dictionaries Online for financial regulator is “a person 
or organization that has been given the official job of making sure that banks, financial 
businesses, etc. act in a responsible way and do not break the law” (2014). In this thesis 
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financial regulator’s definition applies also to bank regulator, but as the thesis is only con-
sidering bank regulation in European Union, the definition for regulator is limited to organi-
zations regulating banks in the mentioned demographic area. 
 
Capital 
 
Capital is in a central role in this thesis as one main source of risk in the banking sector. 
Capital in this context means wealth that banks hold in form of cash or other assets, such 
as liquid securities or receivables. Capital also refers to credit and equity. In this thesis 
capital is linked to risks and regulations and thus I am using the European Commission’s 
capital definition – “The accounting definition of capital is not the same as the definition 
used for regulatory capital purposes. For the purposes of prudential requirements for 
banks, capital is not obtained simply by deducting the value of an institution's liabilities 
(what it owes) from its assets (what it owns). (…) Only capital that is at all times freely 
available to absorb losses qualifies as regulatory capital.” (2013a, 12). 
 
Tier 1 capital ratio 
 
Tier 1 capital is a concept describing bank’s core equity capital, the backbone for capital 
adequacy. The Tier 1 capital ratio appears often in sources discussing banking regulation 
and means the ratio between the bank’s core equity and their risk-weighted assets. Risk-
weighted assets may be for example the letter of credits a bank is issuing (asset that 
holds credit risk). (Investopedia 2014) 
 
Liquidity 
 
Liquidity in this thesis refers to “a measure of the extent to which (…) organization has 
cash to meet immediate and short-term obligations, or assets that can be quickly con-
verted to do this.” (Business Dictionary 2014). Liquidity in banks is closely regulated and 
monitored. 
 
Resolvability 
 
Thomas F. Huertas has written a special paper with a topic “A resolvable bank”. In the ab-
stract he states: Making banks resolvable is a key component of the regulatory reform 
program enacted in response to the crisis. (Hurtas 2014, 1). According to Hurtas, “a re-
solvable bank is one that is “safe to fail”: it can fail and be resolved without cost to the tax-
payer and without significant disruption to the financial markets or the economy at large”. 
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(Hurtas 2014, 1). In this thesis, resolvability follows the definition by Hurtas and supports 
the view that many new regulations are building both stronger but also more resilient 
banks in Europe. 
 
Global systematically important banks (“Too Big to Fail”) 
 
The Basel Committee has identified global systematically important banks (GSIBs) by 
their own assessment methodology. This definition means globally functioning banks that 
may seriously harm the real economy if their own business starts to weaken (Bank for In-
ternational Settlements Publications 2013b). The same definition is parallel to the term 
“Too Big to Fail”. The concept reflects to the size, or other economic measures, of banks 
and to the illusion that due to a bank’s importance it would be immune to bankruptcy. 
 
The three pressures 
 
Represented first in the report by KPMG (2014). Banks face an increased pressure from 
and towards their customers, investors, and regulators. Evolving banking regulations 
gradually change the business environment where banks operate in through the modifying 
requirements customers, investors, and regulators pass for banks. 
 
Abbreviations 
 
EBA European Banking Authority 
BIS Bank for International Settlements 
SSM Single Supervisory Mechanism 
SRM Single Resolution Mechanism  
SRF Single Resolution Fund 
BRRD Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 
DGSD Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive 
CRD Capital Requirements Directive 
CRR Capital Requirements Regulation  
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2 Theory framework 
2.1 Regulations as its own field of research 
Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge have brought up in Understanding Regulation; Theory, Strat-
egy and Practice (2012), the issues of regulating and the nature of those issues that regu-
lators and different institutions face. Their book deals comprehensively with the complexity 
of regulation in many fields of research – economics and political science among other 
multi-disciplinary fields. In this thesis, I will be concentrating in the economic regulation, 
but to understand the whole spectrum, it is good for one to understand the topic in a wider 
context. 
 
Baldwin et al. argue in Understanding Regulation, we are living in an era of a “regulatory 
stage”. (2012, 2) By “the era of regulatory stage” the authors mean how theory and 
practice of regulation have become widely debated, researched, and at the same time ac-
cepted as its own field of research. According to the authors, regulation has matured as a 
general topic of debate in the past decade (2012, 1) and as a phenomenon it has naturally 
developed a clear division between sceptics and supporters. After making the research for 
this thesis, I could argue that the era of regulatory stage can also been understood as the 
inseparability of regulations in theory and practice. Today, it seems like there is no area in 
business without a touch of regulation. 
 
Baldwin et al. define ”sceptics” in this context as a group that regard regulation to be more 
“red tape” than anything else. Sceptics also often experience that regulations set a burden 
on economic activities and consequently regulations generally have a negative sound to 
them. ‘Supporters’, however, are defined as a group who sees regulations as practical 
tools that make rational control possible both in financial and social fields. (2012, 1) 
 
It has been easy to notice the wide media coverage the regulation issue has gained dur-
ing the past years. International organizations, especially European Union as one of the 
most influential institutions, have faced substantial criticism during the economic crisis. 
Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge state that regulation as a global phenomenon and as a single 
topic has prompted due to the economic hardships. This has also resulted in a greater di-
vision between supporters and sceptics who argue between deregulation and more rigor-
ous touches in the financial field. (2012, 1) 
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2.2 Safety-and-soundness regulations vs. compliance regulations 
Now we know that regulating in general arouses debate, but why are there so much de-
bate on financial regulations if the main focus is to safe-guard economic stability for insti-
tutions as well as private consumers? 
 
Bert Ely, a financial institutions and monetary policy consultant in Ely & Company Inc., 
writes about financial regulations in his article on The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics 
(Financial Regulation 2008). He names two divisions of financial regulations: safety-and-
soundness regulations and compliance regulations. Regulations in these two sub-catego-
ries both aim to protect market and individual financial actors in the developed world, but 
from a different viewpoint. Ely differentiates safety-and-soundness regulations and compli-
ance regulations by the nature of the financial actors they are protecting.  
 
According to Ely, safety-and-soundness regulations within financial field concern deposi-
tory institutions, such as banks, that “transform liquid liabilities into relatively illiquid assets 
such as home mortgages and car loans”. (2008). Ely argues that on the opposing side of 
depository institutions are their customers who can be considered to be “fixed-amount 
creditors”. In the article, Ely proposes that the main purpose of safety-and-soundness reg-
ulations is to protect fixed-amount creditors by ensuring solvency of the depository institu-
tions and at the same time the overall stability of financial markets. Safety-and-sound-
ness, or solvency regulations, tries to ensure that account holders and bank depositors 
will be protected from losses that would occur in case of bank’s insolvency. The stress is 
on the prevention of insolvency rather than on how to solve problems caused by insol-
vent financial institutions. 
 
The other subcategory of financial regulations according to the article is compliance regu-
lation. Ely refers to compliance regulations from the individuals’ point-of-view, but stresses 
how compliance regulations have become “a major responsibility for the regulators and a 
major cost burden for financial institutions.” (Ely, B. 2008). The article discusses how com-
pliance regulations are to protect consumers from unfair treatment, but also to provide 
protection for institutions against external money-laundering threats. The article is written 
from an US-perspective, but European Union is also passing the same strict regulations 
on compliance to ensure transparency and stable business environment, as well as to 
avoid any criminal acts against banks and other financial institutions. Avoiding any money 
laundering acts is in a key position today, and compliance regulations as part of new 
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banking regulatory changes can be seen in banks as added reporting requirements to fi-
nancial supervisors. Despite the ever-growing importance of compliance regulations, in 
this thesis I will be concentrating on safety-and-soundness regulations. 
 
2.3 Bank failure theories 
Charles Calomiris (2007) has written a working paper for National Bureau of Economic re-
search in USA concerning bank failures. The paper deals with the history and theory be-
hind bank failures and it provides an interesting viewpoint to support today’s rigorous 
banking regulatory frameworks – especially regulations supporting banks’ solvency. So 
how do bank failures and theories behind them support the current rigorous banking regu-
lation sphere? If one thinks about the recent global financial crisis, it is obvious that no 
one in the public saw it coming. It was like a ticking time bomb behind the scenes, as 
large commercial banks had taken too much credit risk in lending. In the United States, 
home ownership was encouraged and the public had an easy access to take mortgages 
that were not backed by on an adequate level in the lending banks. Banks providing easy-
access and high-risk loans were concentrating on a short-term profits and not on long-
term value creation (Wikipedia 2014a). It was only a matter of time when this incautious 
trend would come to an end and it did peak in 2006 as a “housing bubble” in the U.S.A. 
According to the comprehensive investigative report by United States Senate (2011) high 
risk lending, regulatory failures, inflated credit ratings, and investment bank abuses were 
the four main causes for the financial collapse. 
 
After the high risks taken by banks and the lack of capital to secure the risks transpired, 
“the values of securities tied to U.S. real estate pricing [started] to plummet, damaging fi-
nancial institutions globally” (Wikipedia 2014a). The confidence of investors was at stake, 
as the solvency level of banks became questionable and the availability to take credit be-
came harder. The stock markets started to plummet around the world and the economies 
and international trade took a great hit. The total collapse of a number of banks were pre-
vented by large bailouts of national governments, but not without a cost – the financial cri-
sis and global economic depression still continues today. (Wikipedia 2014a). 
 
According to Charles Calomiris, new theoretical models suggest that even “banks that are 
intrinsically solvent are subjected to large unwarranted withdrawals and may fail as a con-
sequence of this withdrawal pressure” (2007, 3). An important aspect to this theory is the 
panic approach. According to the paper, panic withdrawals and withdrawal pressures 
formed on the market by frightened depositors may result in a collapse of even a solvent 
bank. In addition to the panic-approach, Calomiris calls this theory as a “contagion” cause 
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of bank failure. His suggestion of banking crisis being “contagious” supports the above-
mentioned development of the recent financial crisis. Due to global stock markets, interna-
tional trade, fast electronic money transfers, and such, no bank, or economy, is safe from 
the negative effects happening on the market, if they don’t have safeguarded their busi-
ness. 
 
Calomiris also presents another approach to bank failures: fundamentals as causes of 
bank failures (2007, 3). This theory perhaps applies more to this day, whereas the panic-
approach was more common for example during the Great Depression of the 1930s (Cal-
omiris 2007, 5.) The author suggests that as opposed to the “panic” approach, the “funda-
mentalis” approach calls for “a chain of causation from non-panic-related, observable, ex-
ogenous adverse changes in the economic conditions of banks, to intrinsic weakening of 
bank condition, ultimately leading to bank failure” (Calomiris 2007, 6). The approach im-
plies that even though banks would be passive responders to macroeconomic shocks, 
their decisions “to curtail the supplies of loans and deposits in response to adverse 
shocks” will “magnify economic shocks” (Calomiris 2007, 6). This is an interesting view-
point that actually relates very closely to banks’ operations through pricing and credit rat-
ing, for example. 
 
These two approaches – panic vs fundamental approach presented by Charles W. Calo-
miris – provide motives to protect banks, as no matter what the source of shock is, banks 
are seen as magnifiers of macroeconomic disturbance. (2007, 6) These bank failure theo-
ries also support the view that the size of a bank does not protect it from total collapse. 
Later in this thesis, one will be shown how the global systematically important banks, or 
“too-big-to-fail” banks, are identified today to add transparency and to remove the danger-
ous presumption that some banks would be too important to let them go bankrupt. As we 
learned from Calomiris’ bank failure theories, it not about saving a bank from the bank-
ruptcy, but rather preventing the situation where banks would become insolvent. 
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3 Regulatory framework in Europe – Who are the regulators? 
In this section I will be presenting four major institutions or organizations who are involved 
in reshaping the banking regulatory framework in European Union. The organizations I 
have selected is my personal viewpoint on the issue as a researcher and I selected them 
based on the organizations’ importance and concrete regulatory reforms. During the re-
search, I have noticed that to understand the whole spectrum of the current banking regu-
latory situation, it is crucial to know some history and background of banking regulations. 
This also includes understanding the structure of an organization and their major commit-
ments. The four regulatory organizations I have selected are operating both on a global 
and European level. Even though this thesis is concentrating only on banking regulations 
affecting banks within the European Union, in today’s global business environment bank-
ing regulations are very much the same in all developed countries. According to a memo 
published by the European Commission, the recent financial crisis has taught an im-
portant lesson how “enforcing the cooperation of monetary, fiscal and supervisory authori-
ties across the globe is an absolute necessity.” (2013a, 1). 
 
The regulators, such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, work globally to-
gether with central banks and national supervisors to implement new banking regulations. 
Banking regulatory sphere is extremely complex – global organizations guide area specific 
legislators, such as the European Commission in the European Union, and they again 
pass the legislation on to the national supervisors who ensure all banks within their na-
tional borders apply the new banking regulation. In the following graph I have collected the 
institutions I will be presenting, to give a quick glance on what levels they are operating. 
 
Figure 2: Different levels of banking regulation 
National level
European 
level
Global level Bank for International Settlements & Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
European 
Commission & 
European Central 
Bank
National 
Supervisory 
authorities and 
central banks
National banks
European Banking 
Authority
The Single 
Rulebook
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3.1 European Commission 
European Commission is contributing to the sustainable growth of European economy by 
four main objectives: creating and enforcing financial stability, financial integration, market 
integrity and confidence, and efficiency. These objectives also form the base for new re-
forms taken place within EU area (figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3: Overview of the reform objectives (European Commission 2014a) 
 
Since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008, the European Commission has passed 
on around 40 new proposals to commit to their mission of achieving financial stability and 
deeper integration. The initiatives are closely linked to the new financial regulatory frame-
work developed by the G20. (European Commission 2014b) One can notice that almost 
all authorities and regulative organizations seem to have almost identical objectives when 
it comes to stabilizing the economy and recovering from the glob-al financial crisis. This 
again might cause doubt in public – will the objectives really be accomplished? As a plea 
for the European Commission, one can say that the financial sector reform through new 
proposals has been successful, as almost all of the initiated proposals, or measures for 
the financial reform, have been adopted and are already in force. (European Commission 
2014c) 
 
Michel Barnier, a member of the European Commission in charge of Internal Market and 
Services, discusses in the leaflet Financial reform at the service of growth how taxpayers 
have been the victims of the latest financial crisis and that the new reforms proposed by 
the European Commission ensure that “citizens (…) do not again have to pay for the bad 
practices and excessive risks taken by banks” (2014c). Barnier stresses in the leaflet how 
it’s not only about the new stricter rules and regulations but also about greater global inte-
gration and supervision. 
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3.2 The European Banking Authority (EBA) 
The European Banking Authority (EBA) is one of the most important and influential author-
ities in terms of promoting convergence in the financial regulatory field in the European 
Union’s banking sector. It works as an independent EU Authority and its main task is the 
creation of the Single Rulebook for the banking sector. The Single Rulebook aims to be a 
set of harmonized standards for the banking sector operating within EU area to avoid any 
national disparities when implementing EU-wide banking regulations. EBA is also con-
ducting supervisory activities to ensure banking regulations set in the Single Rulebook are 
implemented and thus depositors, investors, and consumers can be protected at the high-
est level possible. (European Banking Authority 2014) The Single Rulebook will be pre-
sented in more detail later on in this thesis. 
 
The main difference between the EBA and other organizations represented in this thesis 
(excluding European Commission) is that the EBA can produce binding Technical Stand-
ards (BTS) that are legally binding and will be aspects of EU legislatives (directives or reg-
ulations) after being endorsed by European Commission . The EBA can also produce 
other non-regulatory documents, such as recommendations, opinions, and other regular 
reports to endorse transparency, fair market atmosphere, simplicity, and coherency. (Eu-
ropean Banking Authority 2014) 
 
3.3 Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
The Bank for International Settlements, more commonly known as the BIS, was founded 
in 1930 in Basel, Switzerland. It is considered to be the oldest international financial or-
ganization that nowadays provides various services and support for central banks and 
other monetary authorities all over the world (Deutsche Bundesbank 2014). It is also 
known as “the bank of central banks” as it provides wide range of financial services for 
central banks. This makes it an important cooperative body for Euro countries’ central 
banks, as well as to the European Central Bank. The organizational structure of the BIS is 
extensive including associations, committees, secretariats, and other departments with 
specific core responsibility areas. Currently, there are sixty members in BIS and the mem-
bers are either central banks or other monetary institutions, such as the European Central 
Bank (Bank for International Settlements 2014c, 2). 
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Figure 4: BIS members (Wikipedia 2014b) 
 
The main focus for the work of the BIS is fostering financial and monetary cooperation 
with strong global aspect by promoting discussion, conducting research, and by acting as 
a primary counterparty in financial transactions between central banks. The main task is to 
act as an agent in fostering the financial stability and cooperation, but the actual facilitative 
process is done in its specialized departments and committees (Bank for International 
Settlements 2014c, 2). According to the Germany’s central bank, Deutsche Bundesbank, 
the regular meetings at central bank governor level are important discussion hubs for 
dealing with the current financial market situation and issues concerning it (2014). 
 
The BIS facilitates financial and monetary cooperation by its secretariats, such as the Ba-
sel Committee on Banking Supervision and the Committee on Global Banking Supervi-
sion. In the upcoming chapters, one will learn how the Basel Committee on Banking Su-
pervision is contributing to the financial stability and how extensive their importance is in 
the global banking sector. In addition to these above-mentioned organizations, the BIS 
hosts a number of other secretariats and independent organizations, and works as an um-
brella to the whole network of financial stability operators. Despite the demarcation of this 
thesis to only banking regulations, it is important to notice that the BIS is also maintaining 
stability in the insurance sector and together with the banking sector they form up the 
overall financial sector.  (Bank for International Settlements 2014c, 3) 
 
3.4 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
The history of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (initially known as Committee on 
Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices) has its roots in the early 1970s. The 
Committee was established after few negligent incidents within financial field that resulted 
in heavy economic losses in international banking. In 1974 Bankhaus Herstatt lost its 
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banking license due to having three times more foreign exchange exposure than what the 
bank had capital in reserve. This caused international losses also outside the German 
borders. At the same time, a US-based bank, the Franklin National Bank of New York was 
forced to close down for the same reason. (Bank for International Settlements 2013a, 1) 
 
Until 1974, banking supervisory activities were practiced by domestic supervisory institu-
tions, but after the incident described above, G10 countries found that international com-
mittee was needed to protect international financial markets. The Committee on Banking 
Regulations and Supervisory Practices was established in February 1975 to form an open 
forum for discussion and to increase quality in global banking supervision. Original mem-
bers included G10 countries, but today the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is 
formed by 27 institutions, including central and national banks from all over the globe. 
(Bank for International Settlements 2013a). Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has 
no legal force, but the minimum requirements and recommendations designed for supervi-
sory in finance are closely monitored and expected to be implemented by all Basel Com-
mittee members, or independent national authorities (i.e. national banks and other pru-
dential supervision authorities). The work of Basel Committee is observed by many re-
spected and well-known institutions. The stress on the observation is in the European fi-
nancial market and the main observers today include the European Commission, the Eu-
ropean Central Bank, the European Banking Authority, the International Monetary Fund 
and the Financial Stability Institute. (Bank for International Settlements 2013b, Appendix 
A). 
 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is in the core of creating financial stability in the 
global banking sector by designing Basel Accords, or the comprehensive banking regula-
tory frameworks. Basel frameworks form the base for banking regulation reforms also in 
the European Union. According to the Basel Committee, the target is to create “resilience 
at the individual bank level” to reduce “the risk of system wide shocks” (Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements 2014d.) The actual work of Basel Committee, the Basel Accords, will be 
presented in the next chapter to give a sense of how extensive the “Basel process” is, and 
how the three Basel Accords have helped central banks and national financial authorities 
reshape banking regulations and supervision. The Basel Committee’s work is also the key 
pillar of current global debate on financial stability. (Deutsche Bundesbank 2014) 
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4 Banking regulatory framework in Europe – How is it working? 
In the previous chapter, one was introduced to the four major organizations, or regulators, 
affecting the reformation of banking regulations in the European Union.  In this chapter I 
want to demonstrate what kinds of actions are taken in order to create safer and more co-
herent banking system within European Union. I have collected here four key aspects that 
in my opinion form the base for more resilient banking sector within EU. As proposed ear-
lier, creating coherent banking regulation sphere in such an economically diverse area as 
European Union is not an easy task and thus it has to start quite far from individual banks. 
After researching the issue, I found that European Union is truly pushing hard to achieve 
new kind of financial stability by creating new regulative mechanisms, and using these 
mechanisms for implementing banking regulations more effectively in the whole European 
Union area. In this section I will move from grass roots level of establishing banking union 
in European Union, to explaining how the Single Rulebook is used as a tool in the applica-
tion of new banking regulations in all European banks. After that, I will move to more de-
tailed information on how banks are categorized by their influence to the overall economy 
and how the categorization affects banks in terms of new required safety measures and 
capital buffers. In the end of this chapter, I will present the development of a very im-
portant global banking regulatory framework called the Basel Accords. 
 
4.1 Establishing Banking Union 
The need for establishing a common Banking Union in Europe became clear when the 
global financial crisis hit the Eurozone harder than many other economic areas. In 2012, it 
was agreed by a number of EU institutions that a banking union would be created to sup-
port the economic and monetary union, and to enforce centralized application of EU-wide 
rules for the financial sector. The new regulatory framework for the Banking Union is to 
cover all banks in the Euro area and thus there need to be a strong supervisory authority 
appointed for it. European Central Bank (ECB) was appointed to be in charge of the over-
all supervision of the new banking union. ECB will take on the task from the beginning of 
November, 2014. To prepare ECB for the task and to gain a truthful and timely picture of 
the Eurozone banks’ financial health, comprehensive assessments are currently being 
carried out by different EU institutions (European Commission 2014d, 2). According to the 
10 October 2014 press release by the Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority, the as-
sessment of financial institutions has been completed and the assessments included a to-
tal of 130 euro area banks, including Finnish banks such as Nordea Bank Finland Group, 
OP-Pohjola Group and Danske Bank Plc Group. 
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The new financial supervisory mechanisms are being built in a whole new way so that the 
European Central Bank will be in charge of the supervision of all Eurozone banks – either 
directly or through national supervisors that will support ECB in the supervisory task. Ac-
cording to the Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority (Fiva) the above-mentioned assess-
ment was “undertaken as a risk-based review of the balance sheets of the banks that are 
due to come under direct ECB supervision” (Financial Supervisory Authority 2014). 
 
4.1.1 Key elements of the Banking Union 
 
Figure 4: Key elements of the Banking Union 
 
The two key safety pillars in the Banking Union (Figure 4) are the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) (Feelingeurope.eu 
2014). The supervisory and resolution mechanisms provide the Banking Union with an op-
portunity to comprise centralized supervision and a centralized resolution regime that all 
financial actors in 28 Member States in the European Union must comply. (Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer 2014) The idea behind the new Banking Union is to move from hav-
ing the risk of failing banks on tax payers to creating new, European wide, safety net in 
form of a Single Resolution Fund. (European Commission 2014d, 1-2). 
 
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, Bert Ely has suggested that there are two categories of 
financial regulations: safety-and-soundness regulations and compliance regulations. (Ely 
2008) Banking Union represents both of these regulation categories, as compliance is-
sues are covered by the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the safety-and-soundness 
regulations are included in the Single Resolution Mechanism. The Single Resolution 
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Mechanism includes a new Single Resolution Fund (SRF) that is used in case of execut-
ing any bank resolutions (Pwc 2014). 
 
The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is one of the two current key elements of the 
Banking Union. The SSM legislative package was adopted in September 2013 by the Eu-
ropean parliament and it contains specific tasks related to banking supervision and finan-
cial stability. The approved SSM package includes a Council Regulation that will give the 
power for supervision for the European Central Bank. The SSM Regulation is consistent 
with the existent EU regulatory framework and concerns the daily tasks of banking super-
vision, as well as some powers to practice early intervention if a bank is breaching regula-
tory requirements. (European Commission 2013) 
 
Whereas the SSM regulation sets out the general supervisory acts for the European Cen-
tral Bank, the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) defines the common procedures and 
assessment criteria in the case a bank within the Eurozone needs to be put into the reso-
lution process. The resolution mechanism is needed to avoid any possible financial dam-
age to the overall European economy. All Eurozone banks are involved in the SSM and 
SRM procedures, but also other EU Member States may opt into the mechanism. One key 
aspect of the SRM regime is the forming of a new Single Resolution Fund (SRF). Accord-
ing to the analysis of PwC, the SRF is not to be used as bailout fund for troubled banks, 
but rather a “lubricant” in the resolution process to finance the use of resolution tools. 
(PwC 2014, 9) The Fund is still in the development process together with other aspect of 
the SSM and SRM regime, but it’s important to notice how the earlier trust-based Euro-
zone is developing towards much more regulated and systematic entity in the following 
years. 
 
4.2 The Single Rulebook 
In the previous section, one was introduced to the Banking Union and to the mechanisms 
that are used to achieve the Banking Union’s targeted goals. The Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) also relate to the Single 
Rulebook, as can be seen in the Figure 5 below. The Single Rulebook is meant to work as 
a key tool to achieve safer and sounder post-financial crisis market within European Un-
ion. The Single Rulebook consists of initiatives that are common to all financial actors 
operating in the EU area. Restoring financial stability calls for “stronger prudential re-
quirements for banks, improved depositor protection and rules for managing failing banks” 
and together these rules and regulations form the Single Rulebook. According to the Euro-
pean Association of Co-operative Banks, the new rules set common requirements for 
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“higher ratio and the better quality of capital, introduce additional capital buffers, enhance 
governance and introduce new ratios regarding liquidity and leverage” (2014). 
 
 
Figure 5: Single Rulebook for the European Single Market (EACB 2014) 
 
The Single Rulebook covers common capital requirements, resolution mechanisms, and 
deposit guarantee schemes. The Capital Requirement legislative package in the Single 
Rulebook includes the new Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRDIV) and Capital Re-
quirements Regulation (CRR) provisions that implement the global Basel III agreement 
in the European Union. By EU passing CRRs directly, it will avoid any national diver-
gences that passing directives would cause when implementing directives into national 
legislation. CRR implementing Basel III in the European Union requires no further actions 
from national authorities and thus it supports the view on having one “single rulebook” for 
banking regulation across the EU. (Rating Focus 2014) 
 
The prevention of future financial crisis is seen as the base for new, enhanced financial 
regulations for banks, but the recovery and resolution of banks is taken into account. 
Dirk Schoenmaker and Daniel Gros have been investigating the current Eurozone banking 
system and some threats that the European banking sector is facing. In their CEPS work-
ing paper – A European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund – they aim to promote 
discussion and debate concerning the current system and how to build a European wide 
safety net for cross-border banks. Schoenmaker and Gros have described the European 
banking sector in their working paper by quoting Mervyn King, the Governor of the Bank of 
England, saying that “banks are international in life but national in death” (2012, 1). One of 
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the principles of a good safety net is that it has sufficient geographical reach. As stated by 
Schoenmaker and Gros (2012, 2), “To foster the stability of banks, the safety net should 
have the same geographical reach as the main activities of a bank. So European banks 
need a European safety net”. The working paper states there is a need for a proper safety 
net, especially in Europe, as cross-border banking cannot be efficient and/or stable when 
weak domestic banking systems threat the whole European-level banking system. (2012, 
1). 
 
In the Single Rulebook, Schoenmaker and Gros’s call for safety net has been answered 
when resolution and guarantee schemes have been harmonized on a whole European 
level. The BRRD, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, ensures that resolution 
authorities are established in all member states with the dedication to cooperate with Eu-
ropean authorities to prevent failing banks. The Directive will also introduce the new 
framework for resolution mechanism with three aspects: prevention, early intervention, 
and the resolution of failing banks. (European Association of Co-operative Banks 2014) 
The Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive (DGSD) of the Single Rulebook requires all 
national banks within Eurozone to cover individual depositors’ deposits in banks up to 
€100.000 instead of the earlier €20.000. This Directive is meant to harmonize the guaran-
tee scheme across the Euro area and protect depositors in case of an insolvent credit in-
stitution, and also to minimize the risk of “panic withdrawals” that could strongly harm the 
overall financial stability. (European Association of Co-operative Banks) 
 
4.3 Identifying global systematically important banks (G-SIBs) 
One of the most important engagements Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has 
been concentrating since the beginning of the latest global economic crisis in 2007, is the 
creation of a systematic methodology for identifying global systematically important banks 
(from now on referred to as G-SIBs). The methodology was created in 2011 and it was re-
vised in 2013 to meet the current needs. (Bank for International Settlements Publications, 
2013a) 
 
Identifying G-SIBs is important to prevent a repeat of the global financial crisis, as the G-
SIBs play a central role in the financial market. Accenture explains in their Basel III hand-
book that finding the sufficient level of capital for each bank is important. According to the 
Handbook, the latest financial crisis showed that insufficient, poor quality and also non-
available (illiquid) capital was the reason many institutions weren’t able to tackle losses as 
they occurred, and this led to even a bigger crisis. (Accenture 2012) 
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The assessment methodology assesses banks and their global systematic importance in 
terms of the “impact that a bank’s failure can have on the global financial system and 
wider economy” (Bank for International Settlements Publications 2013b, 5.) In more practi-
cal terms, the greater global impact a bank holds towards the overall economy, the 
greater safety buffers it needs. The assessment of banks is done by using a five-sector 
indicator-based measurement approach developed by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision. The five indicators for which banks are calculated scores are: cross-juris-
dictional activity, size, interconnectedness, financial institution infrastructure, and 
complexity. (Bank for International Settlements Publications 2013b, 5) 
 
Michael Beaton explains in his article “Updated G-SIB methodology highlights importance 
of data” (Economonitor 2013) how exceeding the pre-determined cutoff levels for each in-
dicator brings the bank closer to being identified as a Global systematically important 
bank. Beaton adds that the overall score is calculated by taking a simple average of the 
above mentioned five-category scores. All G-SIBs are then allocated into five equal-sized 
buckets based on the banks’ scores in the assessment. (Economonitor 2013) As illus-
trated in the Figure 6, each bucket has a specified higher loss absorbency requirement as 
a percentage. Banks that are placed into bucket four and five correspond the highest im-
portance to the overall economy in case of the bank’s failure. As of November 2013, 
HSBC and JP Morgan Chase are in the bucket four, bucket five being empty. As the list of 
G-SIBs is updated every year, the allocation in the buckets may also change if there are 
some major changes in the bank’s business. 
 
 
Figure 6: Buckets for higher loss absorbency requirements (Beaton 2013) 
 
As an example of a G-SIB company is Nordea Bank (Financial Stability Board Publica-
tions 2013, 3). In practice it means Nordea has been assessed by using the indicator-
based measurement approach developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion and the bank has exceeded the cut-off levels in some or all of the following catego-
ries: cross-jurisdictional activity, size, interconnectedness, financial institution infrastruc-
ture, and complexity. The average score for Nordea Bank is above the cutoff-level, and 
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thus it is considered a global systematically important bank, a G-SIB. Nordea Bank is as-
sessed to fall into the first bucket, meaning the bank is required to implement a 1.0% 
higher loss absorbency rate for capital than a non G-SIB. This is to be done in January 
2016 at the latest (Financial Stability Board Publications 2013, 1.) 
 
5 The Basel Accords in the European Union 
The Basel Accords – Basel I, Basel II, and Basel III – form a set of banking regulation rec-
ommendations that banks are encouraged to follow (Wikipedia 2014b). As the term ‘rec-
ommendation’ suggests, they are not legally binding as such, but for example within the 
EU area, Basel regulations are implemented in the EU community law after being viewed, 
possibly modified, and then approved by suitable EU bodies. European Central Bank pub-
lished an Occasional Paper in 2005 that discussed the adoption of Basel II into EU legisla-
tion. The Abstract of the paper states that “Although the EU rules are to a large extent 
based on the texts of the Basel Committee, modifications have been introduced to ac-
count for the specific legal and institutional setting, as well as for some features of the Eu-
ropean financial system” (Dierick, Pires, Scheicher & Spitzer, 5). In this section, I have 
collected the important aspects and development of Basel I, Basel II, and Basel III, to give 
a sense of how mitigating banks’ credit, market, and operational risks are handled in EU 
through Basel Accord. Due to the generality of the information I will be presenting here, I 
have mainly used information provided by the Basel Committee. 
 
5.1 Development of Basel I and Basel II frameworks 
The main focus for the Basel Committee’s work since the early times has been on ensur-
ing adequate capital in financial institutions and by this strengthening the overall stability 
of international banking system. To do this, the Basel Committee has been developing Ba-
sel I and Basel II frameworks that have evolved over time, and currently Basel III is in the 
development and implementation process. 
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Figure 7: History of Basel (Causal Capital 2012) 
 
In 1988, the measurement system for adequate capital requirements developed by the 
Basel Committee became known as the Basel Capital Record (also known as the Ac-
cord) and it was published around the world to be used in international banks to meet the 
minimum capital ratio to risk-weighted assets of 8%. According to the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements, the Accord was to “work towards greater convergence in the measure-
ment of capital adequacy” and by this remove any source of inequality caused by differ-
ences in national requirements around the world. (Bank for International Settlements, A 
brief history of the Basel Committee 2013, 2) 
 
The first Basel framework, The Accord, was redefined in the 1990s by several amend-
ments including clearer definitions to help with capital adequacy calculations and risk-
recognition. In 1996, a major amendment was made to the 1988 Accord as market risk 
was included in the framework. Before this, the framework had concentrated only on credit 
risks arising from the “changes in value associated with unexpected changes in credit 
quality” (Duffie & Singleton 2003, 3). With the inclusion of market risk in the Accord, the 
Basel framework took a whole new dimension in the risk measurement and control. Mar-
ket risk can be defined as “the risk of unexpected changes in prices or rates” and this can 
cause unexpected volatility and changes in the performance of different securities. (Duffie 
& Singleton 2003, 4) 
 
In 1999, Basel Committee proposed to issue a new framework to replace the 1988 Ac-
cord. The Accord was replaced in 2004 by the Revised Capital Framework, today known 
as the Basel II, and it included a number of changes and improvements prepared over a 
six-year consultancy period. In the Revised Capital Framework, the importance of govern-
ing and revising especially the capital requirements for “internationally active banks” be-
came much more central than before. (Bank for International Settlements 2006, 1) In addi-
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tion to the improvements, the revised version also includes elements from the 1988 Ac-
cord that the Commission wanted to keep and thus the Basel II is a sequence to the Basel 
I framework. 
 
The new framework is based on three pillars, which were developed based on a thorough 
research with experts in global banking sector, central banks and in external observer in-
stitutions and organizations. (Bank for International Settlements 2013a, 3.) The three pil-
lars, that form the base for the Basel II, are presented in the Figure 8. 
  
 
Figure 8: The Capital Accord of Basel II (Noweco, 2007) 
 
The first pillar in Basel II sets out the minimum capital requirements to manage credit 
risk, market risk, and operational risks. The calculations define the minimum capital re-
quirements to cover credit, market, and operational risks based on capital in Tier 1 (core 
capital) and Tier 2 (supplementary capital). As stated in the previous chapters, the inclu-
sion of market risks only became viable in the 1996 amendment. Now, the Basel II does 
not only recognize credit and markets risks in the capital requirements, but also the opera-
tional risks. (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2006a, 12; 14) European Banking 
Authority states that operational risks are included in the EU legislation and they are de-
fined as financial risks that stem from “inadequate or failed internal processes, people and 
systems or from external events.” EU legislation clarifies that operational risks include le-
gal risks but exclude reputational risks and that operational risks need to be “embedded in 
all banking products and activities.” (EBA, Operational risk 2014) 
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The second pillar concentrates on the key principles of the supervisory review. Basel 
Committee describes Pillar 2 in the Comprehensive Version of the Revised Framework as 
follows: 
 
This section discusses the key principles of supervisory review, risk management 
guidance and supervisory transparency and accountability produced by the Commit-
tee with respect to banking risks, including guidance relating to, among other things, 
the treatment of interest rate risk in the banking book, credit risk (stress testing, defi-
nition of default, residual risk, and credit concentration risk), operational risk, en-
hanced cross-border communication and cooperation, and securitization. (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision 2006a, 204.) 
 
The Committee stresses that the supervisory review is a two-fold entity: it is meant to en-
sure the adequate capital to support risks involved in the business and also to encourage 
banks to develop strong and comprehensive risk management processes. The Committee 
has recognized four key principles for the supervisory review that are guiding not only the 
supervisory authorities, but also bank’s internal processes to meet with the required risk 
management standards. 
 
The second Pillar also identifies some additional issues and risks that should be taken into 
consideration in the supervisory review. These risks are not directly addressed in the Pillar 
1. The section provides additional guidance to supervisory authorities to assess whether 
the calculations conducted in the Pillar 1 for adequate capital requirements are enough to 
cover the risk exposure in some exceptions. (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
2006a, 212) The business environment, infrastructure, and possible special characteris-
tics should be the basis for the review of the risk exposure. 
 
The third pillar of Basel II is designed to complement the first two pillars by providing 
guiding principles for banking supervisory authorities acting on a national and international 
level. Supervisory authorities can demand the bank to disclose additional disclosure re-
quirements under safety and soundness grounds (Basel Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion 2006a, 226). The disclosure requirements in the Pillar III are additional requirements 
to the general accounting requirements and they are designed not to conflict with broader 
accounting disclosures. Thus “the Committee intends to maintain an ongoing relationship 
with the accounting authorities” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2006a, 227). 
Part 4 in the Comprehensive Version of the Revised Framework explains how Pillar 3 con-
stitutes to the Basel II: 
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The purpose of Pillar 3 ─ market discipline is to complement the minimum capital 
requirements (Pillar 1) and the supervisory review process (Pillar 2). The Committee 
aims to encourage market discipline by developing a set of disclosure requirements 
which will allow market participants to assess key pieces of information on the scope 
of application, capital, risk exposures, risk assessment processes, and hence the 
capital adequacy of the institution. The Committee believes that such disclosures 
have particular relevance under the Framework, where reliance on internal method-
ologies gives banks more discretion in assessing capital requirements. (Basel Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision 2006a, 226.) 
 
5.2 Executing Basel III in EU 
We have now gone through the Basel I and Basel II frameworks, and one might be won-
dering why is there still needed a third amendment to the same Basel Accord? I was stud-
ying the issue and found that there is a clear reasoning to support the third amendment 
according to the European Commission. Based on Commission’s memo from 16 July 
2013, there are three important lessons that are learnt from the recent global financial 
crisis. Firstly, the cooperation between global monetary, fiscal, and supervisory authorities 
is a necessity, secondly the quality of capital and corporate governance outperforms the 
capital levels, and thirdly the failures of international financial groups need to be resolved 
on a cross border context and not on a national level. (2013a, 1-2). 
 
The European Union is actively participating in the discussion forums in the Basel Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision to address the European banking specificities, as well as 
actively participate in the developments regarding the new capital, liquidity, and leverage 
standards. (European Commission 2013a, 4). European Commission stresses in their 
memo (13/690) that there are two important reasons that prevent European Union from 
just “copy/pasting” the Basel III into EU legislation. Firstly, the Basel regulations are not a 
law, but a set of international standards and strong recommendations. Secondly, the Ba-
sel regulations as such only apply to certain banks with “international activity”. However, 
European Union wants to apply the capital, liquidity, and leverage standards, as well as 
other enhanced requirements, in all banks and investment institutions within European 
Union. These two reasons are why Basel III needs to go through a comprehensive “demo-
cratic control as it is transposed into EU (and national) law”. (European Commission 
2013a, 4.) 
 
Due to the willingness to make Basel III standards fit in the European legislation regime as 
well as possible, Basel III regulations are applied throughout European Union by binding 
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Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRDIV) and the Capital Requirements Regulation 
(CRR). The CRDIV/CRR were both briefly introduced in the chapter 4.2, the Single Rule-
book, but in this section the reader will gain more insightful picture on what these provi-
sions and regulations truly hold in. One will also learn how the Directive and Regulation 
execute Basel III framework in Europe in terms of capital and liquidity requirements (Pillar 
1), supervision and risk-management (Pillar 2), and market discipline (Pillar 3), as illus-
trated in the Figure 9 below. In short, Basel III proposes to make banks stronger by re-
questing banks to have better and more capital, more balanced liquidity, and a leverage 
back stop. (European Commission 2013a, 3.) 
 
 
Figure 9: Basel III (Finsbury Solutions 2014) 
 
5.2.1 The Capital Requirement Directive IV (CRDIV) 
As stated in the EU law, directives are goals that all EU member states need to achieve 
by implementing them into their national legislation. Directive sets more freedom for na-
tional legislators, as it is up to them how the directive is implemented into the national leg-
islation, as long as the goals are achieved. The Capital Requirement Directive IV, also 
called CRDIV, has six important aspects national legislators need to consider. They are: 
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remuneration, enhanced governance, diversity, enhanced transparency, systemic risk 
buffer, and other systemic institution buffer. (European Commission 2013a, 3.) 
 
As can been seen from the nature of the six different aspects, the stress on the CRDIV is 
on having more compliance in the internal processes in banks. The directive has a clear 
stance on the second pillar of Basel III that aims to strengthen the supervisory processes 
and firm-wide risk management and capital planning. CRDIV states for example that to re-
gain the trust of EU citizens in the financial sector, the transparency as regards of profits, 
taxes and subsidies in different jurisdictions in banks needs to be added (European Com-
mission 2013a, 5). This means that banks operating in multiple countries need to publish 
the information concerning profits and taxes to the public in all countries they operate in. 
New requirements for disclosing information on remuneration has a strong link to trans-
parency – the remuneration of staff members that have a link to risk taking (i.e. senior 
management and staff in charge of control functions) has to be reported on. This aims to 
recognize if the remuneration of such staff members in charge of risk taking is on an ac-
ceptable and rightful level. (European Commission 2013a, 29). Corporate governance is 
also an important aspect of the new CRDIV. According to the European Commission 
memo 13/690, enhancing corporate governance should help individual banks to avoid ex-
cessive risk-taking and thus the accumulation of excessive risk in the financial system as 
a whole (2013, 27). 
 
Directive 
(Strong links with national law, less 
prescriptive) 
Regulation 
(Detailed and highly prescriptive provisions es-
tablishing a single rule book) 
Access to taking up/pursuit of busi-
ness 
Capital 
 Capital reserve equal to at least 8% of 
risk-weighted assets 
o Minimum requirement for Tier 1 
capital: 4.5% 
Exercise of freedom of establishment 
and free movement of services 
Liquidity 
 Liquidity Coverage Requirement (LCR) 
 Net Stable Funding Requirement 
(NSFR) 
Prudential supervision 
Leverage 
 Reducing leverage ratio 
 Legislative proposal in progress 
Capital buffers Counterparty credit risk 
Corporate governance Large exposures 
Sanctions Disclosure requirements 
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Figure 10: CRDIV and CRR in European Union (European Commission 2013a, 7) 
 
5.2.2 The Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) 
Whereas Directive is less descriptive and is to be implemented into national law by na-
tional legislators themselves, the Regulation is a binding EU-wide law that is enforced as 
such. The Capital Requirements Regulation, CRR, is enforcing Basel III by setting clear 
requirements for banks operating in EU in terms of capital, liquidity, leverage ratios and 
such. It is a very detailed regulation and it will be fully implemented by 1 January 2019 
(European Commission 2013a, 15). The CRR implementation timetable is parallel to the 
implementation timetable of Basel III. 
 
CRR sets clear requirements for banks’ capital: the total amount of capital needs to be 
equal to at least 8% of risk weighted assets. In other words, the more risky assets (i.e. 
risky loans, complex finance arrangements, investments in venture capital firms) the bank 
holds, the more it is required to hold capital. In CRR, the capital is also clearly divided into 
two categories based on its liquidity to ensure the capital in enough to absorb possible 
losses. Tier 1 capital is the most “purest” form of capital that enables the institution to con-
tinue its operations and avoid insolvency. The common equity, or going concern Tier 1 
capital, needs to be at least 4.5% of the total 8% capital requirement. The other form of 
capital, gone concern Tier 2 capital, is to help repaying senior creditors and depositors 
what the bank owes them if the institution fails. (European Commission 2013a, 13.) 
 
In addition to revised capital requirements, the CRR sets clear rules for liquidity. Euro-
pean Commission memo 13/690 clarifies why new rules for liquidity are needed in the light 
of the recent financial crisis. The memo states that there are no harmonized regulatory 
treatment at EU level when it comes to standards for liquidity. This was experienced after 
the hard financial crisis started in the EU – many firms and banks weren’t able to survive 
due to insufficient or poor quality liquid means. The new regulation sets two new liquidity 
buffers for banks in EU: the Liquidity Coverage Requirement (LCR) and the Net Stable 
Funding Requirement (NSFR). The implementation of these new requirements under the 
Regulation is scheduled over a four-year period starting in 2015 and reaching full force in 
2018. (2013, 19). In the following graph one can see how Commission describes LCR and 
NSFR’s key characteristics. 
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Figure 11: Key characteristics of LCR and NSFR (European Commission 2013a, 19) 
 
Third key aspect of the new Capital Requirements Regulation, CRR, is leverage ra-
tio. European Commission explains leverage as an “inherent part of banking activity” and 
it exists “as soon as an entity’s assets exceed its capital base” (2013a, 22). According to 
European Commission, leverage ratio as a bank regulation tool is new, and thus there is 
no reported data yet. However, as it is a key aspect in Basel III framework, it will be ap-
plied in EU as well. Gathering data and making needed adjustments is crucial before any 
binding requirements are applied. Highly leveraged institutions were playing an important 
part in the beginning of the latest financial crisis, as many banks had high amount of both 
non-risk weighted and off-balance sheet assets when compared to their capital base. The 
Commission memo states that European Union is not trying to eliminate leverage, but ra-
ther remove the excessive risk-taking by reducing banks’ leverage ratios. (European Com-
mission 2013a, 22-23.) 
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6 How are evolving banking regulations reshaping banks’ business? 
As one has learned, banking regulations are affecting banks’ operations on a very funda-
mental level: capital and liquidity ratios need to be on an acceptable level and in addition 
banks are required to take care of their internal governance and resolvability plans by set-
ting additional capital buffers to be protected from insolvency. In addition, European Union 
implements new resolution funds in all member states though the new Single Rulebook, to 
serve failing banks and to protect the remaining. These are only to mention some of the 
new tightened regulative reforms for banking sector, and it leaves one wondering whether 
all banks and financial operators are capable to comply. The focus in this chapter will be 
on the effects of the newest set of global banking regulations. 
 
6.1 Conceptual framework 
Key words in the beginning of this thesis familiarized the reader with the concept “three 
pressures”. As indicated in the report by KPMG, these three pressures towards banks 
are the bank’s customers, investors, and regulators. (2014, 5). After conducting a compre-
hensive qualitative research, my hypothesis is that these three pressures have always 
been part of the business environment where banks operate, but only after the beginning 
of the latest financial crisis, have they started to heavily reshape banks’ business models 
through evolving banking regulations. 
 
The sphere of evolving banking regulation raises questions and opinions all around the 
world among financial leaders and especially within banks. To give a comprehensive pic-
ture of the current constraints the new financial regulations are causing banks, I will be cit-
ing articles and columns from respected financial magazines, as well as other reliable ma-
terial, such as guides and video material produced by well-known banks. 
 
In this section, I want to bring my hypothesis closer to reality and see what kinds of 
changes bank regulations concerning capital, liquidity, and resolvability are causing in 
banks’ operations. I will be using qualitative information I have found mainly from the sec-
ondary data sources. As an employee in Nordea Bank Finland plc, I also consider myself 
a suitable person for giving a valid viewpoint on how banks are balancing for example be-
tween pressures towards customers and regulators. 
 
6.2 Changes in the business environment 
It may be needless to say that not all banks are capable to meet the new requirements. 
According to a news article written by Deutsche Welle, the number of European banks is 
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rapidly decreasing (2013). Among 27 member states in the European Union, the amount 
on banks dropped by 5.3% from 2011 to 2012, totalling just over 9.000 banks in the end of 
2012. (DW 2013). Banking sector has always been highly regulated sector, but is the 
rapid decrease in the number of European banks an indicator of new kind of direct inter-
connection between restricted banking regulations and the survival of only the toughest 
banks?  
 
According to KPMG’s report on the issues and implications of Basell III, the transition from 
Basel II agreement to the more complex and dynamic global regulatory landscape in Ba-
sel III, is going to be arduous and time-consuming (2011, 2). KPMG suggest in their report 
that all banks ought to make a roadmap for the transition, to see how the new frame-
work will apply to their operations, and thus become more adaptive in the process. The re-
port shows the reader what kinds of changes and impacts are possible, and how the oper-
ations should be possibly re-evaluated to comply with the new requirements. According to 
KPMG, companies should implement a-five-phase plan for the Basel III implementation: 1. 
impact analysis, 2. evaluation of strategic options, 3. preparation, and 4. implementation. 
The fifth phase is ongoing monitoring and communication (2011, 14). According to the re-
port, careful planning and implementation are crucial for a bank’s success. 
 
 
Figure 12: Roadmap for the transition (KPMG 2011, 14) 
 
The impact analysis, as suggested to do by KPMG, includes identifying the key (busi-
ness) areas Basel III affects. Also, assessing the ratios set in the new Basel III framework, 
understanding the requirements, making careful capital planning, calculating bank’s risk-
weighted assets (RWAs), and making earning projections are in a key role when making 
the bank’s impact analysis. The fundamental nature of a bank obviously affects the im-
pacts these new requirements will have – commercial banks, investor banks, and savings 
banks all have to assess the impacts concerning their line of business. (KPMG 2011, 14). 
1. Impact 
analysis
2. evaluation of 
strategic options
3. preparation
4. 
implementation
5. Monitoring and communication is an on-going process 
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The evaluation of strategic options includes for example making suitable adjustments in 
the bank’s line of business or products and examining the strategies concerning capital 
and liquidity management. In bigger banks that operate in multiple countries and even 
continents, this evaluation is a considerable effort, but needs to be done in order to com-
plete the third step – preparation for implementing Basel III requirements. The prepara-
tion phase includes making the changes the evaluation phase brought up. Were there 
any deficiencies in the capital and liquidity management, for example? Are all of the re-
porting mechanisms working – IT infrastructure is working and the needed data can be 
collected for reporting? (KPMG 2011, 14). Capital and liquidity requirements are becoming 
stricter, and as we have learned, the risks related to insufficient capital and liquidity also 
concerns greatly the company’s frontline employees. Is the current education of employ-
ees on a suitable level so that the employees understand their stake on the lending pro-
cess? If a bank goes through its operations carefully, it will be able to notice the contradic-
tions and make needed changes before the implementation process becomes current. 
 
According to KPMG, the implementation process includes complying with liquidity, fund-
ing, and reporting standards, but also possible process redesigns. Some banks also might 
notice that they need to integrate or separate their business lines to comply with the new 
Basel III requirements. (KPMG 2011, 14). According to my own opinion, some banks 
might even find out that their resources and capabilities are not on a required level, and 
this might cause mergers and acquisitions. This also one of the reasons why communi-
cation with all possible stakeholders is important throughout the process, as suggested in 
the report by KPMG. 
 
6.3 What are “the three pressures”? 
KPMG published a comprehensive report on evolving banking regulation in February 
2014. This fresh report has many view-points on the issue, and provides the reader with 
interesting information on how the recent changes in banking regulation affect banks and 
other financial institutions, in regards of pressure from and towards their customers, inves-
tors, and regulators (KPMG 2014, 5). This is a valuable view-point, as it brings my thesis 
topic a lot closer to the reader – new regulations in terms of capital, liquidity, stress-test-
ing, and risk management in reality are not just endless board meetings, numbers and law 
terms, but they also reflect the business environment where banks operate in, and thus 
change the banks’ operating environment. 
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Figure 13: Current sources of pressure for banks (KPMG 2014, 5) 
 
Figure 13 shows how banks face ever-growing pressure to and from three different 
sources due to stricter and evolving banking regulation. Regulators are not only passing 
new regulations to banks, but banks are also responsible for suitable and sufficient report-
ing back to the regulators and other supervisors on global and national levels. Other two 
important segments forming new pressures towards banks are investors and customers, 
such as individual families and small businesses. Private customers and investors want 
high-quality products, as well as sufficient return on their investments. However, to meet 
the new requirements regarding capital, liquidity, and resolvability, banks might be forced 
to make major changes in their product-offerings and prices. This again forms a growing 
challenge for banks to find the balance between customer-satisfaction, cost-effectiveness, 
and legitimacy. 
 
6.4 Balancing operations 
BNP Paribas Fortis, one of the 29 identified G-SIBs in the world, explains some of the ef-
fects Basel III has in real banking business on a 10-minute YouTube video presentation. 
The animated presentation is based on the initial presentation by Lars Machenil (CFO 
BNP Paribas) and Walter Rosenhek (Basel 3 Program Manager BNP Paribas Fortis). The 
video reveals how the new Basel III regulations on liquidity and stress tests affect bank’s 
operations. I was watching the video and quoted here some important parts from the end 
of the video. 
Customers
•Products
•Transparency
•Customer-satisfaction
Investors
•Return on equity
•Risk-return ratio
Regulators
•Meeting capital, 
liquidity, and 
resolvability 
requirements
•Cost of capital
•Risk-governance
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At all times, enough liquidity has to be available to comply with the stress test. This will put 
pressure on the net results. Remember also that the required increase in the capital must 
be set aside, so we are dividing something becoming smaller by something becoming 
larger. This leads to a reduction in return on equity for banks. This is a very tangible Basel 
III impact on banks.  
 
NET RESULTS 
  = ROE  
CAPITAL 
 
The primary challenge to a bank is the managing of the equilibrium between loans and de-
posits. This is a fundamental daily challenge that will drive the banks. As I have explained, 
banks face a profitability challenge. Revenues from cross-selling will be welcome, and on 
top of this cross-selling will be required to manage the equilibrium loans-deposits. How-
ever, this cross-selling also leads to more operational intimacy. (…) While managing the 
balance between deposits and loans, cross-selling will also be key. The operational inti-
macy this will bring, will help to retain required liquidity levels for the stress test. So, this is 
very fundamental to the required calculations for Basel III as well as for the continuity of the 
bank. This leads us to our statement that banks have to have complementary activities to 
the business granting loans and collecting deposits. Cash management is a good example. 
Cash management is key in this context, factoring is also a complementary activity. 
(YouTube Basel III 2012, 7:37-9:27.) 
 
The video was made from an individual bank’s point-of-view and it was discussing the key 
question banks need to ask themselves: How are we going to balance between the new 
banking regulations and the sustainable business? On the YouTube video, BNP Paribas 
Fortis was talking about the importance of “operational intimacy” created by the balance 
between taking deposits to granting loans combined with the right level of cross-selling. In 
the Figure 14, I have pictured this operational intimacy as a triangle to show how deposits 
in a bank form the base for the bank operations together with the granted loans. Cross-
selling I see as a tip of the ice berg, complementing the base – of course noticing that 
without selling there are no deposits or loans. BNP Paribas Fortis was suggesting that if a 
bank succeeded keeping this operational intimacy by creating suitable product offerings, 
the bank can survive from the turbulence caused by tightening capital and liquidity re-
quirements. (YouTube Basel III 2012, 7:37-9:27). 
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Figure 14: Operational intimacy supporting liquidity (BNP Paribas 2012) 
 
6.4.1 The paradoxical pressure of banks towards its investors and regulators 
When it comes to assessing the pressures towards investors and regulators, figure 15 be-
low summarizes the key problem – banking is truly made safer but at the same time inves-
tors see how stricter regulations and requirements shrink the return on equity (ROE). As 
the figure shows, ROE took a deep dive in selected 14 G-SIBs between 2006 and 2008 
from 20% to -10%. In two years, from 2008 to 2010, return on equity climbed to be around 
15% again, but as the global financial crisis took a new hit in 2011-2012, the average re-
turn on equity reduced close to 0%. According to the graph, tier-1 capital ratio has been 
much more stable during the same time period – since 2007 the required capital level has 
steadily increased from 8% to 15% in 2013. (The Economist 2014). It is easy to see how 
this probably affects some of the investors – banks and other institutions affected by the 
new global financial regulations might not be seen as attractive investing targets as pri-
vate companies for example. 
 
CROSS-
SELLING
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Figure 15: Safety vs profit (The Economist 2014) 
 
European Commission suggests in their memo how banks can increase their capital ratio 
to meet new capital requirements. According to the memo, increasing capital ratio can be 
done either by increasing capital by issuing new shares and/or not paying dividends. 
These acts will add retained earnings, as long as the bank does not increase their risk-
weighted assets (RWAs). This also works vice versa – reducing risk-weighted assets will 
increase the capital ratio. Examples of this is to sell loan portfolios or reducing lending. 
(2013, 15.) 
 
Safety versus profit clearly creates a paradox if banks are seeking for greater capital ra-
tios, but investors are seeking for greater return on their own investments. If a bank is re-
fusing to pay dividends to its shareholders, it will cause problems for the company itself, 
as investors can always look for better investment targets. 
 
6.4.2 New banking regulation and its impact on end-customers 
At first it may seem far-fetched, but the stricter banking regulation in terms of new liquidity 
standards, capital buffers, and increased risk-coverage definitely have direct impact on 
customers, as well. When banks need to find suitable responses to the changing regula-
tions, rethinking pricing, funding, risks, and operations in general, are in key position. Ac-
centure has produced a document – Basel III and its consequences: Confronting a New 
Regulatory Environment – and in the document they list some potential response methods 
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banks may find useful when trying to find ways to meet the new requirements. Accenture 
mentions three approaches for banks to respond for regulative changes Basel III causes: 
operational response, tactical response, and strategic response (2011, 7). These re-
sponses are especially useful when evaluating how end-customers of retail banks, for ex-
ample, are affected. In the Figure 16 I have described how new banking regulations af-
fects customers and through which stages it happens when banks are forced to rethink 
their business structures. 
 
Figure 16: Evolving banking regulation and effect on customers 
 
One of the Accenture’s suggestions for potential operational responses to Basel III 
changes is stricter credit approval processes. This approach includes developing credit 
processes to help assessing risks more carefully. Also, taking stress tests as part of the 
credit process helps banks improve their liquidity risk management. (Accenture 2011, 7).  
This will help banks mitigating risks and comply with new levels of capital to risk-weighted 
assets (RWA), but for individual customers it may simply mean lower credit limits and 
longer waiting periods for getting loan applications approved. 
 
More far-reaching tactical responses according to Accenture include for example pricing, 
funding, and asset reconstructing that have effect on a bank’s profitability. These methods 
include adjusting lending rates, adjusting risk-sensitive pricing to match with banks’ higher 
capital and liquidity costs, and shifting to higher-value clients. (2011, 7.) It is clear that 
these adjustments are easily implementable for banks, but it may be resulting in customer 
dissatisfaction. Short-term lending, such as unsecured consumer credits issued for less 
than three years, are becoming more and more expensive all the time, as banks face 
pressure for bigger and more liquid capital reserves that are weighted against risks. How-
ever, for consumers, especially for consumers who can’t provide bank any securities, this 
type of loans are important for making bigger purchases. 
 
Also, when banks face ever-growing pressure from regulators in terms of capital and prof-
itability, banks are tempted to start making radical strategic changes. According to Accen-
ture, this response method to changing banking regulation is called strategic response. It 
may mean for example starting to concentrate on higher-value customers and make other 
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strategic cost reductions, such outsourcing non-core business functions (2001, 8). These 
methods are more far-reaching possibilities to have an effect on banks’ capital ratio, but 
they are as effective as straight-forward methods, such as retaining earning or issuing 
new shares. However, strategic changes usually require complex decisions and if banks 
decide to make strategic readjustments, such as adjusting client segmentation and devot-
ing less resources on specific segments in order to create stronger capital risk structures, 
they need to be aware the consequences to customer satisfaction for example. (Accen-
ture 2011, 8, 13.) Closing branch offices and reducing business hours for serving clients 
ad hoc are also some clear examples of banks’ strategic responses to new bank regula-
tions, especially to Basel III.  
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7 Conclusion 
7.1 The future of European banks 
As one has learned, there are a number of changes the European banking sector is facing 
currently in regards of banking regulation. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is 
working hard for developing existing Basel frameworks and providing banks around the 
world with the new framework, Basel III. The recent financial crisis has woken up the 
sceptics and supporters of financial regulation, but on a European level banks have no 
room for neglecting compliance with regulations. Gtnews, part of the Association for Fi-
nancial Professionals, has produced a Guide to Impact of Regulation on Cash and Trade 
together with Nordea Bank. The guide stresses the importance of pro-active approach to 
the evolving banking regulation and raises awareness on how regulatory changes are of-
ten viewed as another cost of doing business (gtnews 2014, 1). Having read the docu-
ment, I could argue it is often about the banks’ attitude toward the change, even when it 
comes to legal issues and compliance. The guide implies that as the landscape of regula-
tion is always changing, banks could use the changing business environment to identify 
opportunities for greater efficiency and risk-management. Take for example new liquidity 
and capital requirements: to meet the new regulations, banks need to improve their inter-
nal processes to achieve better pricing and risk-management systems and through under-
standing the bank’s revenue generating model they are better able to adjust the product 
offering for compliance of regulations and for more efficient revenue stream. According to 
Gtnews, “the changes are often by-products of regulations that are targeted at making the 
banking system more robust, primarily for the benefit of retail customers” (2014, 1). 
 
In the previous chapters I have given some examples how banks are affected by the regu-
lative changes in terms of capital adequacy, liquidity, and resolvability. It is clear that the 
pressures from various sources are greater than ever before, and some banks fail to meet 
the new requirements. In some cases, evolving banking regulation causes weaker banks 
to find themselves in a situation where their business is not profitable anymore. According 
to an article on Taloussanomat, Björn Wahlroos, the Chairman of the Board for Nordea 
Bank, said in the panel discussion Tulevaisuuden Suomi held in Helsinki on October 
2014, that regulation is good for large corporations as it is one of their competitive ad-
vantages. (2014). He implied especially bigger banks’ larger resources to comply with the 
new regulations and thus his comment is truly justified. However, I believe that even some 
smaller banks who can truly understand the drivers behind the current regulatory changes 
can gain leverage to some larger banks by finding new cost-efficient and even innovative 
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ways to improve their business models and this way comply with the upcoming regula-
tions. A good way for any European bank to find these hidden possibilities and success 
behind evolving banking regulations, is to follow KPMG’s suggestion to make a compre-
hensive transformation roadmap. Especially important this is when banks are fighting their 
way out of clarifying how new Basel III regulations are affecting their operations now and 
in the near future. (KPMG 2011). 
 
7.2 Own learning and relation to professional growth 
As a corporate banking advisor in Nordea Bank Finland, I can underwrite the statement 
BNP Paribas Bank made about operational intimacy. It is strategically important for com-
mercial banks to adapt into changing business environment by setting the goals for cross-
selling and for balanced deposits and loans to meet the new required levels for liquidity 
and capital. This naturally reflects to product-offerings, prices, and customer service. As a 
front-end employee working directly with own assigned corporate customers, I am respon-
sible for providing banking services that supports the bank’s strategy that fulfils all new 
banking regulations, such as CRDIV/CRR provisions for added capital buffers and liquid-
ity, risk-management, and reporting standards. The changes in the banking regulations 
seem straight-forward on a paper, but as one has learned, there are detailed and complex 
legislative background to new banking regulations before they are applied in banks’ oper-
ations. Changing banking regulations heavily reflect on our way of working – knowing your 
customer is the base for all banking services and this relates to the new compliance re-
quirements. The new capital and liquidity requirements reflect not only on the price tag for 
lending, but also to the very base line – developing sufficient IT infrastructure and other 
tools to help employees grant loans at the right price when considering risks, sustainabil-
ity, and capital planning. The effects are great for banks and all operators willing to con-
tinue sustainable business need to rethink all services and prices so that the continuity of 
a bank can be ensured. 
 
I have learned a great deal during this research and writing phase, and the topic has 
evolved when my understanding on the topic has grown. There are a number of interest-
ing view-points that could be used as a research question, but this is only a beginning for 
my research. I am aiming to continue for a Master’s Degree in Aalto University and hope 
to take this topic on a new level by providing some financial institution a detailed plan on 
how to tackle new requirements and find possible competitive advantages behind new 
rules and regulations. I believe my deepened understanding and interest on the whole 
banking regulatory spectrum is on level that will give me an edge to continue my career in 
some specialist position in the future. 
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